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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 5, 1883, C.B. Stuart received a telegram from his
brother: "John is very low. Come on first train."' He rushed to his
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law; B.A., University of Texas;
J.D., St. Mary's University; M.C.L., Southern Methodist University; LL.M., University of
Michigan, Fulbright Scholar.
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Texas; J.D., cum laude St. Mary's University.
The authors would like to express their gratitude to their research assistants: Scott
Allen Carlson and Rob G. Dickinson. Both are second year law students and exhibited a
great deal of enthusiasm and dedication in this endeavor.
'Stuart v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 18 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. 1885). On February 3,
1883, C.B. Stuart, a practicing Waco attorney, was informed that his brother, who re-
sided in Marshall, Texas, was very sick. Id. After receiving the news, he instructed his
other brother, who also lived in Marshall, to contact him by telegraph if his brother's
condition worsened. Id. When the ailing brother's condition deteriorated, a telegram
was sent to Stuart from a Western Union office in Marshall. Id.
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brother's side only to find that he was too late and had not only
missed his dying brother's final three hours but also his funeral. 2
Stuart blamed his untimely arrival on Western Union's failure to
promptly deliver the telegram. 3 He then sued for mental anguish,
claiming that as a result of the untimely delivery of the telegram he
had "suffered great disappointment, grief, and mental anguish." 4
In 1885, the Texas Supreme Court upheld the trial court's award for
mental anguish, holding that "injury to the feelings was actual
damage." 5
Over a century later, seventeen-year old Dan Boyles, Jr. engaged
in sexual intercourse with Susan Leigh Kerr. 6 Unbeknownst to
Kerr, Boyles covertly videotaped the intimate act and then showed
the tape to ten friends. 7 Gossip about the event soon spread and
Kerr became "stigmatized with the reputation of 'porno
queen'.. ."- After being confronted by Kerr, Boyles surrendered
the only copy of the tape. 9 Kerr then filed suit, alleging "that she
suffered humiliation and severe emotional distress from the video-
tape and the gossip surrounding it."I ° On December 2, 1992, the
'Id. at 352. Although the Western Union agent was informed of the necessity for
speedy delivery, the telegram remained in Western Union's Waco office for two days.
Id.
'Id. Western Union owned and operated a telegraph line from Marshall, Texas to
Waco, Texas. Id. For a fee, Western Union transmitted telegrams between the two cit-
ies. Id. The message was delivered for fifty-cents. Id. It was received at the Western
Union office in Waco on February 3, 1893, at 3:00 p.m. Id. C.B. Stuart called Western
Union's Waco office at 4:00 p.m. the same day and asked if a message had been received
for him. Id. The Western Union agent responded in the negative. Id. C.B. Stuart then
informed the agent that his brother was ill and that he was expecting a telegram regard-
ing his condition. Id. The telegram was not delivered until February 5, 1893. Id.
4Id.
-Id. at 353.
Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1993). On August 10, 1985, Dan Boyles,
Jr., a seventeen year old male, and Susan Leigh Kerr, a nineteen year old female, had
sexual relations. The teenagers had shared several previous sexual encounters, how-
ever, they had not had sexual intercourse prior to August 10. Id. The teens were both
home in Houston for the summer and had arranged a date the night of the incident.
Prior to picking Kerr up, Boyles and a friend, Karl Broesche, arranged to use the
Broesche house for the sexual encounter. d. Boyles agreed to Broesche's idea of vide-
otaping the activity. Id. Prior to Boyles' and Kerr's arrival, Broesche and two friends
concealed a camera in the bedroom. Id. They left with the camera running, and the
ensuing activities were recorded. Id.
'Id. Boyles showed the tape three times in a private residence. Id.
"Id. "At social gatherings, friends and even casual acquaintances would approach her
and comment about the video wanting to know 'what she was going to do' or 'why did
[she] do it'." id.
"Id. at 1.
"'Id. Kerr claimed that the embarrassment surrounding the event affected her aca-
demic performance and made it difficult for her to relate to men. During trial, however,
she testified to engaging in sexual intercourse subsequent to the event. Id.
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Supreme Court of Texas reversed and remanded the trial court's
award, stating that "there is no general duty in Texas not to negli-
gently inflict emotional distress.""
During the one-hundred and nine years spanning from Mr. Stu-
art's untimely arrival at his brother's funeral and Dan Boyles' sur-
reptitiously produced videotape, mental anguish jurisprudence has
witnessed a tumultuous evolution. Consumer law, as codified in the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act,' 2 (hereinafter the "DTPA")
has been uniquely impacted by the evolving law of mental anguish.
This article analyzes issues raised by a recent Texas Supreme
Court opinion which reaffirmed the standard for recovery of mental
anguish damages under the DTPA. The article concludes by re-
jecting the standard. To support this conclusion, the discussion
centers on: 1) an historical overview of mental anguish; 2) the
Texas Supreme Court's current view of mental anguish under the
DTPA; and 3) mental anguish damages under the DTPA in relation
to the rules of judicial construction.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT: MENTAL ANGUISH JURISPRUDENCE
Historically, mental anguish has been treated as the proverbial
"orphan child,"' 3 disguising itself in one tort or another. 14 Not-
11Id.
12 TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1992).
"In a 1939 law review article, William L. Prosser referred to mental anguish as an
"orphan child," positing that mental anguish should be considered as an independent
tort. William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MIcH. L.
REV. 874, 874 (1939).
'"Beginning in the mid-fourteenth century, the court recognized the right to mental
anguish damages when damages were awarded to a tavern keeper's wife who avoided a
hatchet thrown by a dissatisfied customer. I. de S. et ux v. W. de S., Y.B. 22 Edw. 3, fol.
99, pl. 60 (1348). "Although the defendant's conduct was intentional, the importance of
the decision lay in the court's recognition of mental injuries as worthy of compensa-
tion." St. Elizabeth's Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 651 n.2 (Tex. 1987). Instances
abound of torts recognizing the plaintiff's interest in peace of mind. For instance, "the
amorous railroad conductor who let his affections get the best of him, showering kisses
upon a innocent young school marm. Such conduct cost the unwanted suitor's company
$ 1,000 in compensatory damages for her "terror and anguish.., her mental humiliation
and suffering.'" Cracker v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,.36 Wis. 657 (1875). The plaintiff's
right to peace of mind was compensated when the defendant, in the presence of others,
spit in the plaintiff's face. Draper v. Baker, 21 N.W. 527 (Wis. 1884). Mental anguish
was also found when a hotel detective entered the plaintiff's room at night, claiming she
was a prostitute, even though the man who had come to visit her was her husband.
Emmke v. De Silva, 293 F. 17 (8th Cir. 1923); See also 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 483
(1988) (to warrant a recovery for pain and suffering, including mental anguish, that pain
and suffering must be the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act and must be
merely an aggravation of damages naturally ensuing from the act forming the basis of
the complaint); W.A.E., Annotation, Right to Recover for Mental Pain and Anguish Alone,
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withstanding its early recognition in false imprisonment,' 5 defama-
tion,' 6 assault,' 7 battery,' 8 and malicious prosecution cases, '9 the
Apart from other Damages, 23 A.L.R. 361, 383 (1923) (it has been stated that the rule that
damages cannot be recovered for mental suffering unaccompanied by physical injury is
not applicable where the wrong complained of is a wilful one, intended by the wrong-
doer to wound the feelings and produce mental anguish and suffering, or from which
such result should be reasonably anticipated). See generally RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 435A cmt. (1977) (stating there must be a causal connection between the de-
fendant's act and the result).
"Reicheneder v. Skaggs Drug Center, 421 F.2d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating
mental suffering is an element of damages recoverable in a false imprisonment case and
lack of physical injury can not be a bar to recovery); S.H. Kress & Co. v. Rust, 97 S.W.2d
997, 1001 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1936) (stating physical injury is not necessary to
find damages of mental suffering), aff'd 132 Tex. 89, 120 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1938); J.C.
Penney Co. v. Duran, 479 S.W.2d 374, 382 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (stating the fact that no physical injury was inflicted on one complaining of
false imprisonment is not a ground for denying recovery of reasonable compensation for
mental suffering of which humiliation, shame, and fright are elements to be considered);
McDonald v. Henderson, 250 S.W. 463, 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1923, no writ)
(stating the fact that no physical hurt was inflicted on one complaining of a false impris-
onment is no ground for denying recovery of reasonable compensation for mental suf-
fering); Gadsen Gen. Hospital v. Hamilton, 103 So. 553, 554 (Ala. 1925) (plaintiff
awarded $1,500 after being wrongfully detained for not paying bill); Mental and Emotional
Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 149 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1936) ("[s]ubstantial sums
have been recovered for false imprisonments, though the detention was of short dura-
tion and involved no damage other than annoyance and indignity"). See generally 32 Am.
Jur. 2d False Imprisonment § 138 (1982) (stating the fact that no physical injury was
inflicted on one complaining of false imprisonment or arrest has been said not to be
grounds for denying recovery of reasonable compensation for mental suffering).
"'See Greybill v. De Young, 73 P. 1067, 1069 (Cal. 1903) (awarding defamation and
mental anguish damages); Louisville Press Co. v. Tennelly, 49 S.W. 14 (Mo. 1899)
(holding mental anguish damages recoverable in defamation claim); Renfro Drug Co. v.
Lawson, 160 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. 1942) (stating that if the publication is a defamation
as defined in the statute, injury to the reputation of the person defamed is presumed,
and that, with that injury presumed, the mental anguish of the person defamed may be
taken into consideration in awarding damages); A..H. Belo & Co. v. Fuller, 19 S.W. 616,
617 (Tex. 1892) (holding injuries to the feelings need not be proved, they are presumed
in an action of libel, and are thus a proper item of damages); Little Stores v. Isenberg,
172 S.W.2d 13, 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Eastern Section 1943, writ denied) (holding that
damages may be recovered for mental suffering proximately resulting from publication
of defamatory words which are actionable per se); Jozsa v. Moroney, 51 So. 908, 911
(La. 1910) (stating that damages for mental suffering alone can be recovered, although
the plaintiff may have suffered no other injury); see also Calvert Magruder, Mental Distur-
bance In Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936) (discussing early mental anguishjuris-
prudence and its relationship to th'e tort of defamation). See generally 33 Am. Jur. Libel
and Slander § 205 (1941) (while it has been held that mental suffering is not a necessary
consequence of a defamatory publication, the great weight of authority appears to sup-
port the view that damages can be recovered for an injury of such character, where it can
be shown to be the proximate result of the use of words that are actionable per se); 50
Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 358 (1970) (the prevailing view is that damages for
mental suffering are recoverable for defamations which are actionable per se, even
though the plaintiff has suffered no other injury).
"See I. de S. et ux W. de S., Y.B. 22 Edw. 3, f. 99 pl. 60 (1348) (mental anguish
damages awarded in an assault case); Leach v. Leach, 33 S.W. 703, 703 (Tex. Civ. App.
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common law has been hesitant "to accept the interest in peace of
mind as entitled to independent legal protection."
20
1895, writ denied) (holding that in an action for assault, compensation for mental suffer-
ing may be recovered, though there was no battery) (an assault and an assault and bat-
tery violated alike the fight of personal security, and are attended with like injuries to the
person, differing only in the extent thereof); San Antonio Traction Co: v. Crawford, 71
S.W. 306, 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902, no writ) (stating that where a wrongful act is accom-
panied by insult, abuse or oppression, the decided weight of authority is that compensa-
tory damages for mental suffering may be recovered, though there has been no physical
injury) (civil jurisprudence gives compensation for mental sufferings occasioned by the
acts of wanton injustice equally whether they operate by way of direct or consequential
injuries); William Small & Co. v. Lonergan, 105 P. 27, 29 (Kan. 1909) (holding that an
assault upon another is an intentional infringement upon the absolute right of personal
security, for which the law gives a right of action against the wrongdoer in which dam-
ages for mental suffering, which is the proximate and natural result of such wrong, may
be awarded, although there is no battery or bodily injury inflicted); See generally W.A.E.,
Annotation, Right to Recover for Mental Pain and Anguish Alone, Apart from other Damages, 23
A.L.R. 361, 389-90 (1923) (physical injury is not a necessary prerequisite to receive
compensation due to an assault of the person and menial suffering is inflicted); 6 AM.
JuR. 2D Assault and Battery §§ 178, 183 (1963) (damages may be recovered in an action
for assault, although there was no battery and no bodily injury was inflicted).
'"See Draper, 21 N.W. at 527 (malicious prosecution and mental anguish); Craker, 36
Wis.at 678 (holding that all mental suffering directly consequent upon tort, irrespec-
tively of all such inscrutable distinctions, is ground for compensatory damages in action
for tort); See generally W.A.E., Annotation, Right to Recover for Mental Pain and Anguish
Alone, Apart from other Damages, 23 A.L.R. 361, 383 (1923) (where the act was wrongful
and wilful, mental anguish damages should be awarded from which such result should
be reasonably anticipated); 6 Am.Jur. 2d Assault and Battery §§ 178, 183 (1963) (dam-
ages for mental suffering may be recovered whether or not the plaintiff received any
physical injury as a result of the battery).
"Haeissig v. Decker, 166 N.W. 1085 (Minn. 1918); Anthony v. Norton, 56 P. 529
(Kan. 1899); Morgan v. Curley, 7 N.E. 726, 728 (Mass. 1886) (the plaintiff may recover
compensation for loss of time and for any indignity he may have suffered as a result of
an arrest which is illegal); Wheeler v. Hanson, 37 N.E. 382; 386'(Mass. 1894) (holding
that the injury to the plaintiff's feeling and subjecting him to indignity was sufficient to
warrant compensation as damages); Flam v. Lee, 90 N.W. 70, 71 (Iowa 1902) (holding
that in an action for malicious prosecution, it was 'not error to permit the plaintiff to
show that, on his arrest at his home his mother fainted, or was prostrated by the shock,
and that plaintiff thereby suffered distress of mind); Seidler v. Burns, 85 A. 369, 369
(Conn. 1912) (holding that the infliction of mental anguish was an element which the
jury might have properly considered in assessing damages).
2'William Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MIcH L. REV.
874, 874 (1939); See also 52 Am. Jur. 2d Malicious Prosecution § 97 (1970) (the plaintiff
may recover for humiliation, embarrassment: and mental suffering provided these can
be shown to have resulted as a proximate consequence of the defendant's act); See gener-
ally W.E.A., Annotation, Right to Recover for Mental Pain and Anguish Alone, Apart from other
Damages, 23 A.L.R. 361, 361 (1923) (it may be stated that where the act of the defendant
was negligent merely, there is a tendency to hold that damages from mental pain and
suffering are not recoverable); but see Id. at 361-362, 391 (but where the act of the de-
fendant was wilful or malicious or both, there is a general tendency to hold that damages
for mental pain and suffering may be recovered, although these are the only damages
recoverable in the case) ("A man may recover for any injury or indignity done the body,
and it would be a reproach to the law if physical injuries might be recovered .for, and not
those incorporeal injuries which would cause much greater suffering and humiliation.").
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In 1861, in the parent of a long line of decisions refusing to rec-
ognize mental anguish, Lord Wensleydale wrote, "Mental pain or
anxiety, the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when
the unlawful act complained of causes that alone." 2' Although Lord
Wensleydale's dictum may have been somewhat misleading, courts
have been reluctant to recognize one's interest in peace of mind.22
This judicial reluctance stemmed from traditional notions that
mental anguish was too "metaphysical," too subtle, and too "specu-
lative to be capable of admeasurement by any standard known to the
law." 23 Instead, such "minor annoyances" were relegated to instru-
ments of social control other than the law, believing that a certain
toughening of the mental hide was a better protection than the law
could ever be.24 One commentator described mental anguish dam-
ages as parasitic, predicting that "[t]he treatment of any element of
damages as a parasitic factor belongs essentially to a transitory stage
of legal evolution. A factor which is today recognized as parasitic
will, forsooth, tomorrow be recognized as an independent basis of
"Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861). See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emo-
tional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv L. REV. 1033, 1033 (1936) (quoting Lynch
v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 598 (1861)); see also William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of
Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874, 875 (1039) (discussing the law's
reluctance to recognize mental anguish as an independent cause of action).
12-In a large number of cases, from a substantial number of jurisdictions, it has been
stated that there can be no recovery for mental pain and suffering alone resulting from
the merely negligent act of another. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Trott, 25 S.W. 419, (Tex.
1894) (defendant was negligent in attaching horses to the plaintiff's wagon, which
caused damage to the plaintiff's property, but with no physical injury to the plaintiff
mental suffering cannot be recovered as an element of those damages); Texarkana & FT.
S. Ry. v. Anderson, 53 S.W. 673, 675 (Ark. 1899) (where a passenger was carried be-
yond her destination, without circumstance of aggravation of personal injury, and suf-
fered an unimportant delay of two hours, there being nothing to show the value of time
and labor lost, nominal damages are all that can be recovered, without an independent
personal injury, one cannot recover for mental suffering alone); Kansas City, FT. S. &
M.R. Co. v. Dalton, 70 P. 645, 646 (Kan. 1902) (in an action for damages sustained by
reason of the negligence of a railway company in carrying a passenger beyond her point
of destination in the nighttime, thereby causing her expense, annoyance, inconvenience,
loss of time, fright, and mental suffering, no recovery can be had for the fright or mental
suffering as an independent element of damages, unaccompanied by physical or bodily
injury); Southern Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612, 612-13 (1916) (defendant's failure
to promptly deliver casket and graves clothes to plaintiff for his wife's burial was not
sufficient to merit recovery of any damages for mere mental suffering occasioned by
such delay); Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936).
2:1Mitchell v. Rochester Ry Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896). Asserting the inherent diffi-
culty in evaluating mental anguish damages, and the propensity to open the floodgates
of litigation, early jurisprudence was reluctant to recognize an independent cause of
action for articles).
2
1Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 589 N.E.2d 365 (N.Y. 1992).
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liability." 25 As a result of academicians, rather than courts, the pro-
phetic words of this commentator have been realized in most
jurisdictions. 2
6
Introduced in the articles of law journals and other scholarly legal
writing, the tort of intentional infliction of severe mental distress
was formally defined in the pages of the Restatement of Torts in
1948.27 Although most jurisdictions currently allow recovery for
the intentional infliction of mental anguish,2 8 the tort still remains
largely undefined.
29
'See David Crump, Evaluating Independent Torts Based Upon "Intentional" or "Negligent"
Infliction of Emotion Distress: How Can We Keep the Baby from Dissolving in the Bath Water?, 34
Ariz. L. Rev. 438, 457 (1992) (discussing limits of tort of negligent infliction of emo-
tional DISTRESS).
-"Some relationships between parties are assumed tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress); See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) (the modern
tort was introduced in the pages of law reviews, and then refined and finally defined by
the American Law Institute in its Restatements).
"'RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, SUPPLEMENT, TORTS § 46 (1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 46 (1965). See Daniel Gilvelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the
Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 42, 42 (1982) (discussing the advent of the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress). THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) states:
§ 46 Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress
1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emo-
tional distress, and if bodily harm to others results from it, for such bodily
harm.
2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to
liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the
time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm
b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress re-
sults in bodily harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).2"E.g. Savage v. Boies, 272 P.2d 349 (Ariz. 1954); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v.
Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952); Rugg v. McCarty, 476 P.2d 753 (Colo. 1970); Ams-
den v. Grinnel Mut. Reins Corp., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1974); Dawson v. Associates
Financial Servs. Co., 529 P.2d 104 (Kan. 1974); Vicnire v. Ford-Motor Credit Co., 401
A.2d 148 (Me. 1979); George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 268 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1971). See
Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Inten-
tional Infliction of Emotional Distress b Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 43 n.9
(1982) (listing states that have adopted the Restatement).
""The development of the tort of mental anguish through the first half of the twentieth
century is evidenced through a series of law review articles: Bohlen, Right to Recover for
Injury Resultingfiom Negligence Without Impact, 41 AM. L. REG. (1902); Throckmorton, Dam-
ages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV. 260 (1921); Goodrich, Emotional Disturbances as Legal
Damages, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497 (1922); Bohlen and Polikoff, Liability in Pennsylvania for
Physical Effects of Fright, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 627 (1932); Hallen, Damages for Physical Injuries
Resultingfiom Fright or Shock, 19 VA. L. REV. 253 (1933); Hallen, Hill v. Kimball - M.lilepost
in the Law, 12 TEX. L. REV. I (1953); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law
of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); William Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental
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In some jurisdictions, mental anguish jurisprudence has evolved
at a more rapid pace. Numerous courts have bypassed the intent
requirement and adopted the tort of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. 30 This tort has been limited, however, to three situa-
tions. Many jurisdictions hold that a duty not to negligently inflict
emotional distress arises from the contractual relationship. 3' Some
jurisdictions hold that emotional damages are recoverable only if
the plaintiff proves a recognized tort.32 Finally, most jurisdictions
recognize bystander claims where the negligence causes an emo-
tional injury. 33 By definition, a negligent act is not as culpable as an
Suffenng: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939). See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS 55 n. 1 (5th ed. 1984) (listing series of influential mental anguish
articles).
"'Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 589 N.E.2d 365 (N.Y. 1992).
"1See David Crump, Evaluating Independent Torts Based Upon "Intentional" or 'Negligent"
Infliction of Emotional Distress: How Can We Keep the Baby from Dissolving in the Bath Rater?,
34 ARM. L. REV. 438, 457 (1992) (discussing limits of tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress). Some relationships between parties are assumed to include a con-
tractual obligation. Review of the contractual obligation has been undertaken by an
analysis of whether the contractual duty has been breached through the negligence of
the defendant. See, e.g., St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 650-54 (Tex.
1987) (the hospital's mishandling of the infant corpse lead to liability imposed for negli-
gence); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Shaw, 177 S.W.2d 52, 54-55 (Tex. 1944) (stating that
the defendant entered into a contractual relationship with the plaintiff, and the resulting
negligent failure to promptly deliver a death telegram, which resulted in the grandpar-
ents' inability to attend the funeral of the deceased child); Clark v. Smith, 494 S.W.2d
192, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that a contractual rela-
tionship existed between the funeral home and the plaintiffs and the negligent failure to
embalm the body, resulting in the putrefying of the body, was actionable and the attach-
ment of liability is appropriate); cf. Dunn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 59 S.E. 189, 190-91
(Ga. Ct. App. 1907) (telegraph agent insulted plaintiff while having an implied duty of
extending their facilities free of abuse, humiliation, insult); See also Johnson v. State, 334
N.E.2d 590, 590 (N.Y. 1975) (imposing liability for hospital's negligently informing pa-
tient that her mother had died when she had not through analogy of corpse cases).
"'See David Crump, Evaluating Independent Torts Based Upon "'Intentional" or "'Negligent"
Infliction of Emotional Distress: How Can We Keep the Baby from Dissolving in the Bath 1'ater?,
34 ARIz. L. REV. 438, 457 (1992) (discussing limits of tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress). E.g., Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Tex. 1983) (hold-
ing that emotional distress is an element of damages recoverable in a negligence claim
such as a wrongful death action as a result of an automobile accident); Tacket v. General
Motors Corp. Delco Remy Div., 818 F. Supp. 1243, 1247-48 (S.D. Ind. 1993) (under
Indiana law, plaintiff may recover compensatory damages for mental anguish when tort
involves intentional invasion of legal right); Ball v. Joy Mfg., 755 F. Supp. 1344, 1364
(S.D. W. Va. 1990) (holding that damages for emotional distress may be recovered
where distress accompanies or contemporaneously follows actual physical injury caused
by impact upon occurrence of a tort); Tran v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., No.
Civ. A. 88- 1836, 1989 WL 64564 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (Pennsylvania courts have allowed
recovery for mental suffering in cases involving intentional torts).
:':'See David Crump, Evaluating Independent Torts Based Upon "Intentional" or 'Negligent"
Infliction of Emotional Distress: How Can Il e Keep the Baby from Dissolving in the Bath W1 ater?,
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intentional act and, therefore, makes recovery of mental anguish
more likely.
34
III. MENTAL ANGUISH DAMAGES IN TEXAS
In Texas, mental anguish jurisprudence has witnessed a tumultu-
ous evolution. Its genesis can be traced back to 1885 when the
Supreme Court of Texas authorized mental anguish damages for a
plaintiff who suffered physical injury as a result of the defendant's
conduct.3 5 That same year, the court awarded damages to a plaintiff
34 ARIZ. L. REV. 438, 457 (1992) (discussing limits of tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress). See also Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912,925 (Cal. 1968) (damages may
be recovered for emotional trauma and physical injury resulting from plaintiff's witness-
ing fatal accident in which her sister was killed) (this was a landmark case adopting the
theory of bystander recovery and since then most other jurisdictions have adopted varia-
tions of this concept); cf. Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1978, no writ) (holding that the plaintiff was "so close to the reality of the
accident as to render her experience an integral part of it."); Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d
300, 306 (N.H. 1979) (the plaintiffs were "relatively close ... in both time and geogra-
phy [to] the negligent act .. "); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981)
(when the plaintiff is related to the victim within the second degree of affinity or consan-
guinity he may recover); Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 766 (Haw. 1974) (absence of
a blood relationship should not foreclose recovery when the plaintiff witnessed his foster
grandmother being killed as he stood several feet away); See generally RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 313(2), 436(3) (1965) (the jurisdictions that have recognized by-
stander claims have used various means to limit them by the inclusion or adoption that
the claimant be in the zone of physical danger, the claimant be within a familial relation-
ship to the victim, and the resulting harm be foreseeable) (the restatement approach
requires that the claimant be in the zone of physical danger).
"4See David Crump, Evaluating Independent Torts Based Upon "'Intentional" or "Aegligent"
Infliction of Emotional Distress: How Can We Keep the Baby from Dissolving in the Bath Water?,
34 ARIZ. L. REV. 438, 457 (1992) (discussing limits of tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress).
"Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Curry, 54 Tex. 86 (Tex. 1885). In Victorian Railways
Comm'rs v. Coultas, the Privy Counsel held that "damages for shock arising from fear
unaccompanied by physical injury were too remote and could not be considered a con-
sequence which, in the ordinary course of things, would flow from the negligence..."
St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 651 n.2 (1987) (quoting Victorian Rail-
ways Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888). The Coultas case was soon
overruled, in Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669 (D.C. 1901), but not before its holding
was adopted by an American court in Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y.
1896). Soon, a majority ofjurisdictions, including Texas, gravitated to the language of
Mitchell, establishing barriers to mental anguish damages.
Relying on the New York court's holding in Mitchell, in 1885 the Texas Supreme Court
held that mental distress damages were appropriate only when the plaintiff suffers physi-
cal injury. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Curry, 54 Tex. 86 (1885). In 1890, however, the Texas
Supreme Court awarded mental anguish damages to a plaintiff where the ensuing
mental anguish resulted in physical injury. In Hill v. Kimball, the plaintiff suffered a mis-
carriage as a result of witnessing a street fight. 13 S.W. 59 (Tex. 1890). The court
further defined its stance on mental anguish when it awarded damages to a plaintiff who
suffered mental anguish as a result of the defendant's negligence. In Stuart, the court
further held that "the complaining party may... recover, as actual damages, compensa-
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whose injuries were limited to mental anguish.3 6 A decade later, in
Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Hayter, the state's highest court further
defined mental anguish jurisprudence in Texas, holding that mental
anguish damages were recoverable when the ensuing mental
anguish results in physical injury. 37 Thus, during the early stages of
mental anguish jurisprudence in Texas, "mental anguish damages
were recoverable when they were the product of or caused by physi-
cal injuries, or even in the absence of physical injury."38 However,
decades of litigation have proven that these early cases can be some-
what misleading.
IV. MODERN MENTAL ANGUISH DAMAGES IN TEXAS
Years of vexatious litigation have complicated the law of mental
anguish in Texas. This is illustrated by the variety of definitions of
mental anguish cited by Texas courts. Courts frequently cite the
definition articulated in Trevino v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
which describes mental anguish as an element of damages
"impl[ying] a relatively high degree of mental pain and dis-
tress. It is more than mere disappointment, anger, resent-
ment, or embarrassment, although it may include all of
these. It includes a mental sensation of pain resulting from
such painful emotions as grief, severe disappointment, in-
dignation, wounded pride, shame, despair and/or public
humiliation.' 
39
tion for the proximate results of the wrongful act. . ;[w]hen injury to the feeling [en-
sues] .... Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 S.W. 351, 353 (Tex. 1885).
'"Stuart, 18 S.W. at 351.
"54 S.W. 944 (Tex. 1900).
'"Timothy G. Chovanec, David F. Bragg andJohn D. Gill, MentalAnguish Damages, Tex.
Bar Assn. (1992). The rule has been stated that there can be no recovery for mental
pain and suffering unaccompanied by any physical injury. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v.
Porfert, 10 S.W. 207, 207 (Tex. 1888); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Trott, 25 S.W. 419, 419
(Tex. 1894) (mental suffering is not an element of damages if no physical injury to the
plaintiff).
In contrast, the Texas Supreme Court in Leach v. Leach held that one who is guilty of
assault upon another is liable for the mental suffering resulting from such assault,
although there is no battery or bodily injury inflicted. 33 S.W. at 703; San Antonio
Traction Co. v. Crawford, 71 S.W. 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902, no writ)(stating that where
a wrongful act accompanied by insult, abuse, or oppression, damages for mental suffer-
ing may be recovered, though there has been no physical injury). In Missouri P. Ry. Co. v.
Martino, the court held a carrier liable for humiliation and mental suffering resulting to a
passenger from verbal abuse, unaccompanied by any other breach of duty. 21 S.W. 781,
781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, rev'd on other grounds).
"'Trevino v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 582 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1979, no writ). See, e.g., Ryder Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Latham, 593 S.W.2d
334, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441
v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 639 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
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Migraine headaches, 40 humiliation,4' inability to sleep,42 fear for
safety, 43 embarrassment, 44 anxiety, 45 despondency, 46 loss of self-es-
teem,47 shock,48 and nervousness 49 have all been found by Texas
courts to be symptoms of mental anguish.
per curiam, 686 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1985); City of Ingleside v. Kneuper, 768 S.W.2d 451,
460 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied); Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias, 831 S.W.2d 81,
85-86 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ). In wrongful, death cases, mental anguish has
a different definition. It is described as "the emotional pain, torment, and suffering that
the plaintiff would, in reasonable probability, experience from the death of a family
member." Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Tex. 1986).
4
0 North Star Dodge Sales, Inc. v. Luna, 653 S.W.2d 892, 897 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1983), aff'd, 667 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. 1984); Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc. v. Nabhan,
808 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ dism'd) (stating that the plaintiff
testified that she suffered chronic headaches which affected her domestic environment
and had trouble sleeping); Kneip v. UnitedBank-Victoria, 734 S.W.2d 130, 136 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ) (plaintiff, among other things, suffered from loss of
sleep and headaches held sufficient to support award for mental anguish).
"Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Davis, 709 S.W.2d 785, 793- 95 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e); Havens v. Tomball Community Hosp., 793 S.W.2d 690,
691-92 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (stating that suffering of hu-
miliation was sufficient to award the plaintiff mental anguish damages).
"J.B. Custom Design & Bldg. v. Clawson, 794 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton[lst Dist] 1990, no writ); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d 590,
601 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1991, writ denied) (stating that plaintiffs felt intimidated, con-
fused, frightened, betrayed, scared, angry and devastated and were unable to sleep held
sufficient to prove mental anguish); Skaggs, 808 S.W.2d at 202 (stating the plaintiff's
inability to sleep was a proper element of damages); Kneip, 734 S.W.2d at 136 (plaintiff
testified that he suffered from loss of sleep).
4"Group Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. Daniel, 704 S.W.2d 870, 878-79 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1985, no writ) (stating that the evidence of mental anguish contained in the rec-
ord was that the appellee was "scared" because of her personal financial situation);
Kneuper, 768 S.W.2d at 460 (stating that testimony that the plaintiff was in "great fear"
and "total panic" because they had seven children and no way to support them was
sufficient to award mental anguish damages).
"Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Marshall, 699 S.W.2d 896, 904 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist] 1985), aff'd, 724 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1987); J.B. Custom Design & Bldg. v.
Clawson, 794 S.W.2d 38, 43 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ) (holding
that the plaintiffs experienced a "tremendous amount of mental anguish, embarrass-
ment, and distress" is legally and factually sufficient to support award for mental
anguish); Miller v. Dickenson, 677 S.W.2d 253, 259-60 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (embarrassment of plaintiff was sufficient to support award of $2,000
for mental anguish).
"4Clawson, 794 S.W.2d at 43 (stating distress [anxiety] was an element within calcula-
tion of damages).
"Marshall, 699 S.W.2d at 904.
4"Id.
4
1Underwriters Life Ins. Co. v. Cobb, 746 S.W.2d 810, 819 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1988, no writ) (stating shock was an element of mental anguish damages).
49Id.; Kneip v. UnitedBank-Victoria, 734 S.W.2d 130, 136 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1987, no writ) (stating that plaintiff testified that she suffered from loss of sleep,
headaches, and a nervous stomach); City of Ingleside v. Knueper, 768 S.W.2d 451, 460
(Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied) (plaintiff among other things was "nervous and
irritable").
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In Texas, the courts have tended to concentrate on who can re-
cover mental anguish damages,50 and what must be proven for this
recovery. 51 Currently, the Texas courts allow mental anguish dam-
ages when the plaintiff is a direct victim of the wrongdoing, 52 a by-
stander to the wrongful conduct, 53 or a family member whose loved
one has been injured as a result of another's conduct.54 In 1987, in
St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard,55 the Supreme Court of Texas af-
forded greater protection to emotional injuries by recognizing the
tort of negligent infliction of mental distress. Recently however, in
Boyles v. Kerr, the Supreme Court of Texas abolished this tort, re-
turning mental anguish jurisprudence in Texas back to the pre-Gar-
rard days.56
In the past, the mental anguish 'plaintiff had the burden to prove
that there was a physical injury to demonstrate that the mental
anguish resulted in a physical manifestation.57 Although this re-
quirement has been eliminated, "[t]here is considerable confusion
presently as to the elements of proof necessary to sustain mental
anguish damages." 58 This confusion is further heightened by the
"'TIMOTHY G. CHOVANEC, ET AL, MENTAL ANGUISH DAMAGES, s-12 (1992); See cases
cited infra notes 52-54.
"Id.; In order to recover for mental anguish it is necessary to offer proof of more than
mere worry, anxiety, vexation, or anger. Freedom Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Dickinson,
598 S.W.2d 714, 718 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Cactus
Drilling Co. v. McGinty, 580 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ);
Ryder Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Latham, 593 S.W.2d 334 (tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979,
writ refd n.r.e.). See also Cobb, 746 S.W.2d at 819 (stating that to recover for mental
anguish, the plaintiff must prove "such painful emotions as grief, severe disappoint-
ment, indignation, wounded pride, shame, despair, or public humiliation"); Tidelands
Auto Club v. Walters, 699 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (stating proof of physical injury is no longer required).
"See St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987) (mental anguish
damages for victim); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Lane, 720 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1986, no writ).
"See Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 489-90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no
writ); Bedgood v. Madalin, 589 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975), rev'd
on other grounds, 600 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1980) (mental anguish damages and bystander).
"'See Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1985) (hold-
ing that recovery is available to surviving spouse, children, and parents; Moore v. Lil-
lebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 688 Tex. 1986) (defining "mental anguish" in cases brought
under the Wrongful Death Act as "the emotional pain, torment, and suffering that the
named plaintiff would, in reasonable probability, experience from the death of the fam-
ily member").
"'730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987).
"'Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
"See St. Elizabeth Hosp., 730 S.W.2d at 649 (discussing history of mental anguish in
Texas).
" TIMOTHY G. CHOVANEC, ET At.., MENTAL ANGUISH DAMAGES, S-I l (1992)..
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Texas Supreme Court's treatment of mental anguish damages in
DTPA cases.
V. DEFINING THE DTPA
Prior to 1973, consumers' remedies were limited "when it came to
dealing with unscrupulous, or simply careless, merchants." 59 Plain-
tiffs' attorneys were hesitant to take consumer cases because the
amount in controversy was unusually small, making the cost of liti-
gation prohibitive. 60 Although the common law allowed exemplary
damages, the majority of cases lacked the requisite intent necessary
for such an award.6'
In 1973, the Legislature radically revolutionalized consumer law
in Texas by adopting the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Con-
sumer Protection Law.62 By adding this powerful weapon to the
plaintiffs' litigation arsenal, consumers' remedies were no longer
limited to fraud, breach of contract, misrepresentation, and war-
ranty actions. 63 This legislative reform package replaced the tradi-
tional notions of caveat emptor 64 and supplanted it with the doctrine
of caveat venditor.6
5
By adopting a broad definition of "consumer" and allowing treble
"1 RICHARD ALDERMAN, TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES 1 (1988).
"'Enterprise Laredo Assocs. v.- Hachar's Inc., 839 S.W.2d 822, 833 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1992, writ denied) per curiam, 843 S.W.2d 476 (Tex.) (discussing the economic
inefficiency of individual consumer deceptive trade practices suits; State ex rel. Danforth
v. Independence Dodge Inc., 494 S.W.2d 362, 370 (Mo. Ct App. 1973) (stating that the
expenses of litigation often outweigh the amount of recovery; Jeff Sovern, Private Actions
Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIo ST.
L.J. 437, 439-40 (1991) (discussing the probative costs associated with deceptive trade
practice suits at common law);John L. Hill, Introduction, Consumer Protection Symposium, 8
ST. MARY'S L.J. 609 (1977).
"'See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 (1973) (disallowing attorneys fees in deceptive trade
practices suit); e.g. Gale v. Spriggs, 346 S.W.2d 620, 625 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); David A. Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private Consumer Actions, 55 IOWA L.
REV. 307 (1969). John L. Hill, Introduction, Consumer Protection Symposium, 8 ST. MARY'S
LJ. 609 (1977).
62See Consumer Protection Act, 63rd Leg., R.S. ch. 143, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 322
(current version at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41-.63 (VERNON 1987 & Supp.
1992)). SOVERN, supra n.60 at 445. T. LE., PROTECTING CONSUMER RIGHTS § 2.10 at 21
(1987).
"'E.g. Cameron v. Terrel & Garrett Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 537 (1981); Riverside Nat'l
Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1980); and Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d
662, 666 (Tex. 1977); See also G. Richard Shell, Trends in the Law: Substituting Ethical
Standards for Common Law Rules in Commercial Cases: An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1198 (1988); Daniel F. Bragg, Now We're All Consumers: The 1975 Amendments to
the Consumer Protection Acts, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. (1976).
"BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 222 (6th ed. 1990) ("Let the buyer beware").
'"BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 222 (6th ed. 1990) ("Let the seller beware").
839
BAYLOR LA W REVIEW
damages and attorney's fees, the DTPA has revolutionalized con-
sumer law over the past fifteen years. 66 In fact, one commentator
posits that it may be "a DTPA violation for an attorney to not be
familiar with the provisions of this Act." 6
7
To recover under the DTPA, the plaintiff has the burden of plead-
ing and proving three things: 1) that they are a "consumer" under
the Act;68 2) that the defendant has violated the Act; 69 and 3) that
the defendant's conduct was a producing cause of the consumer-
plaintiff's actual damages. 70
A. Actual Damages
In 1979, the DTPA was amended to allow a consumer to receive
"the amount of actual damages found by the trier of fact." 7' While
debating the amendment, the 66th Legislature concluded that the
Act "would include any damages that you could convince the jury
had occurred as a result of a violation of the DTPA." 72 The Act,
"E.g, Cameron, 618 S.W.2d 535; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 & 17.50(b)
(Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1993);'Riverside Nat'l Bank, 603 S.W. 2d at 173; RICHARD M. AL-
DERMAN, TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT, at preface (1988); Goodfriend &
Lynn, Of White Knights and Black Knights: An Analysis of the 1979 Amendments to the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 33 SW L.J. 941, 948-50 (1979) (discussing the lack of scienter
required for recovery of actual damages).
"RICHARD ALDERMAN, TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT, at preface (1988).
"'TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987) defines consumer as:
[A]n individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision or
agency of this state who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or
services, except that the term does not include a business consumer that has
assets of $25 million or more, or that is owned or controlled by a corporation
or entity with assets of $25 million or more.
Cf. Riverside Nat'l Bank, 603 S.W.2d at 173; Rutherford v. Whataburger, Inc., 601
S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
"'Dwight's Discount Cleaner City, Inc., v Scott Fetzer Co., 860 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1108 (1989); Cameron, 618 S.W.2d at 539; e.g. Nobility Homes
of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977) (stating that the act is designed to
protect consumers from any deceptive trade practices); Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under
the Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Reconsidering the FTC as Rule Model, 52 OHIo ST. LJ. 437,
440 (1991); John L. Hill, Introduction, Consumer Protection Symposium, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J.
609 (1977).
7
' See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon 1987); Flenniken v. Longview
Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex. 1983); Cameron, 618 S.W.2d at 539;Julie
A. Davies, Direct Actions for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?, 67 WASH. L. REV. 1, 1
(1992); John L. Hill, Introduction, Consumer Protection Symposium, 8 ST. MARY'S LJ. 609
(1977).
7 TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1992); See also
Knight v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 388; Riverside National
Bank, 603 S.W. 2d at 173 (Tex. 1980); Julie Davies, Direct Actions for Emotional Harm: Is
Compromise Possible?, 67 WASH. L. REV. 1, 24 (1992).
7 2
TIMOTHY G. CHOVANEC, ET AL, MENTAL ANGUISH DAMAGES, s-6 (1992).
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however, failed to define actual damages. 73 Where the Act left off,
the common law picked up, including physical injuries and wrongful
death as actual damages under the Act.7 4 The courts further de-
fined actual damages to include mental anguish regardless of
whether it resulted from physical injury.
75
B. Mental Anguish Under the DTPA
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Texas held' that DTPA plaintiffs
could recover mental anguish damages which did not result'from
physical injuries. 76 In Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co., the
court refused to award mental anguish damages to a plaintiff who
failed to prove either of the two common law requirements of
mental anguish damages: 1) that "the mental anguish was caused
by a willful tort, willful.and wanton disregard or gross negligence; or
that 2) the mental anguish resulted in physical injury." 77 By deny-
ing recovery on these grounds, the court upheld the common law
predicates for mental anguish damages, i.e., that mental anguish
must result from gross negligence or an intentional or willful tort,
and that the mental anguish evidence itself through a physical mani-
festation. 78 The common law further perpetuated these require-
"E.g., Kish v. Van Note, S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex. 1985); (holding that actual damages
are defined as total injury sustained); Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co., 601
S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex. 1980) (stating that the Act does not define "actual damages" but
the term has been construed to mean damages available at common law); Woo v. Great
Southwestern Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978 writ
ref'd n.r.e.)' (holding that actual damages'not defined but' determined by total loss
sustained).
7 E.g., Keller Industries, Inc. v. Reeves, 656 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mahan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Hall, 648 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton (ist Dist] 1982, no writ); Tom Benson Chevrolet, Inc. v. Alvarado, 636 S.W.2d 815
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982; writ ref'd n.r.e.); TEXAS BAR ASSOCIATION MANUAL ON
DTPAJ-10 (1992).
"See American Commercial Colleges v. Davis, 821 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. App.-East-
land 1991, writ denied) (a DTPA plaintiff may recover mental anguish damages for
either proving a tort or a resulting physical injury); See Duncan v. Luke Johnson Ford,
Inc., 603 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1980) (holding that mental anguish damages are recoverable
for tort committed in a grossly negligent manner); Brown, 601 S.W.2d at 939 (holding
that mental anguish damages are recoverable upon proof of willful or knowing act which
results in physical injury; Charles E. Cantu, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Ex-
panding the Rule Evolved Since Dillon, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1557 (1987).
7"'Brown, 601 S.W.2d at 939.
" TEXAS BAR ASSOCIATION, MANUAL ON DTPAJ-I 1 (1992).
'"See Luna, 667 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Tex. 1984) (recovery allowed when there is proof of
a willful tort and physical injury); accord Brown, 601 S.W.2d 931; 1Ybarra, 624 S.W.2d at
952-53; Charles E. Cantu, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Expanding the Rule
Evolved Since Dillon, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1557 (1987); Michael Curry, The 1979 Amend-
ment To The Deceptive Trade Practices: Consumer Protection Act, 1980, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 51
(1980).
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ments, treating mental anguish differently when it did not result
from physical injury, and requiring special proof that the mental
anguish was caused by gross negligence or a willful tort.79
In 1984, the Supreme Court of Texas extended its holding in
Brown, making it difficult for a DTPA plaintiff to recover mental
anguish damages.8 0 In Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc."' the de-
fendant, North Star Dodge Sales, made representations to the plain-
tiff, Luna, regarding the sale of a car.8 2 The trial court, after
remitting the jury's award of $66,600 to Luna, awarded $55,400
against North Star Dodge.8 3 Included in the award was $5,200 for
mental anguish damages.8 4 The Fourth Court of Appeals in San
Antonio reversed and rendered the mental anguish damages, hold-
ing that there "was no allegation or proof of 'willfulness'....-as
The Texas Supreme Court then reversed and remanded "the court
of appeal's judgment concerning the mental anguish .... -86 Rely-
ing on Brown, the court held that the jury's finding, that the uncon-
scionable actions of North Star Dodge "were committed
'knowingly,' was sufficient to support recovery of mental anguish
damages." 87 The court further held that the trial court correctly de-
fined "knowingly" to mean "actual awareness of the falsity, decep-
tion, or unfairness of the act or practice giving rise to the
consumer's claim of actual awareness of an act or practice constitut-
ing a breach of warranty, but actual awareness may be inferred when
objective manifestation indicate that a person acted with actual
awareness." 88 The court then concluded that on the continuum of
blameworthiness, "knowing conduct is more culpable than gross
"'See Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Ferguson, 617 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1981)(hold-
ing that special proof of grossly negligent conduct is necessary to recover mental
anguish damages); Duncan v. Luke Johnson Ford, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1980)
(holding that mental anguish damages were recoverable upon showing gross negli-
gence); Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967)(stating that
recovering mental anguish damages requires the showing of grossly negligent conduct);
Charles E. Cantu, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Expanding the Rule Evolved Since
Dillon, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1557 (1987); Michael Curry, The 1979 Amendment To The
Deceptive Trade Practices: Consumer Protection Act, 1980, 32 BAYLOR L. REv. 51 (1980).
"Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 116 (holding that a plaintiff must prove both that injury re-







"Id. (stating that the definition of "knowingly" follows the statutory definition section
17.45(9) of the DTPA).
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negligence, yet less culpable than intentional actions."8 9
Three years after the court's decision in Luna, mental anguish ju-
risprudence in Texas was radically revolutionalized. By abolishing
the physical manifestation requirement, and recognizing the tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress, it was thought that the
standard articulated in Luna had become somewhat antiquated.90
C. Radical Revolution
This jurisprudential coupe de 'etat materialized in a case styled St.
Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard.91 By recognizing the tort of negligent
infliction for mental anguish, and eliminating the physical injury re-
quirement, the court in Garrard repaved the path for DTPA plaintiffs
seeking mental anguish damages. 92 Relying on the court's decision
in Sanchez v. Schindler,93 which "authorized recovery for mental
anguish damages without proof of physical injury or conduct worse
than negligence," 94 the court held that the Garrard's were entitled
to mental anguish damages resulting from their stillborn daughter's
body being buried in an unmarked grave without their knowledge or
consent.
95
Although the Texas Supreme Court has not expressly overturned
Luna, numerous appellate courts have used Garrard as a springboard
for overturning the "knowing" requirement established by the Luna
court. 96 Recently, the Third Court of Appeals in Austin,97 and the
Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio,98 have gravitated to the
"'Id. at 118. (holding that mental anguish damages are recoverable in the absence of a
knowing finding, if the plaintiff suffered from physical injury as a result of the defend-
ant's conduct).
"'See St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. 1987)(stating that the
supreme court abolished proof of physical injury as a requirement to recover damages
for the negligent infliction of mental anguish); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249
(Tex. 1983)(holding that mental anguish damages authorized without proof of physical
injury or conduct worse than negligence); Charles E. Cantu, Negligent Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress: Expanding the Rule Evolved Since Dillon, 17 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1557, 1574-76
(1987) (discussing the historical evolution of mental anguish damages in Texas).
"'St. Elizabeth Hosp., 730 S.W.2d at 651.
"-'d. at 654.
'Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
'"St. Elizabeth Hosp., 730 S.W.2d at 651.
"-1d. at 650.
"'See Milt Ferguson Motor Co. v. Zeretzke, 827 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1991, no writ) (holding that mental anguish damages were recoverable upon showing
gross negligence); E.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gros, 818 S.W.2d 908 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1991, no writ); Duncan, 603 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1980).
'"State.Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 818 S.W.2d at 908.
"Milt Ferguson Motor Co., 827 S.W.2d 349.
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language on Garrard, dispensing with the "knowing" requirement
imposed by Luna.
On June 26, 1987 the Zeretzkes purchased an automobile from
Milt Ferguson Motor Company. 99 Included in the purchase was a
new car warranty of 5 years/60,000 miles. 00 Three months later;
the car began losing oil pressure.' 0' Mr. Zeretzke returned the car,
and after it was repaired, was informed that " 'the repairs were
done.' "102 The Zeretzkes had addition problems with the car, and
after having the car repeatedly worked on, the Zeretzkes took the
car to an independent mechanic who told them that the engine
block was cracked. 0 3 The Zeretzkes then brought suit under the
DTPA and were awarded damages for repairs, loss of use and
mental anguish. ' 0 4
Relying on Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., appellants argued
that there was "no evidence or insufficient evidence, or plaintiff
failed as a matter of law to prove the predicate finding of a knowing
violation of the DTPA, to allow recovery of damages for mental
anguish ... ," o The Court of Appeals disagreed, holdifig that in St.
Elizabeth Hospital v Garrard the Court recognized a less stringent
standard for recovering mental anguish damages. 0 6 Furthermore,
the court held that in Garrard the Supreme Court, in a footnote, rec-
ognized the holding of the Beaumont Court of Appeals which held,
"We believe [Sanchez] has now authorized the recovery of mental
anguish without proof of physical injury or conduct worse than neg-
ligence."' 1 7 The court concluded by stating that "[t]o hold that
mental anguish damages are only recoverable upon -pleading and
proof that the tort complained of was committed willfully or know-
ingly, would be to require a higher standard of proof, contrary to
the holdings of Sanchez v. Schindler, '08 Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Texas,










'.Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983) (allowing recovery for mental
anguish without proof of physical injury or conduct worse than negligence).
""'Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Texas, Inc. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex.App.-Beau-
mont 1984)(requiring proof of "knowingly" requires undue burden), per cuiam, 714
S.W. 2d 310 (Tex. 1986).
""St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987).
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ther held that Luna was "no longer the law with respect to the neces-
sity to plead and prove that an act was committed willfully or
knowingly to recover damages for mental anguish."'
Until recently, it was believed that the rule articulated in Luna had
limited relevancy. In December of 1992, however, the Supreme
Court of Texas made it very clear that Luna was still good law." 1
2
D. Reaffirming Luna: Boyles v. Kerr
On December 2, 1992, the Supreme Court of Texas held that St.
Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard was overruled "to the extent that it rec-
ognizes an independent right to recover for negligently inflicted
emotional distress."'' The Court further held that "mental
anguish damages should be compensated only in connection with
defendant's breach of some other duty imposed by law.""1
4
Although the facts in Boyles v. Kerr" 5 did not involve the DTPA, the
Court reaffirmed its decision in Luna. In dicta, the Court stated that
"mental anguish damages may not be recovered under the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act absent proof of a knowing viola-
tion." " 6 By eliminating the tort of negligent infliction of severe
mental distress, the Kerr court answered any unresolved question
raised by the lower courts concerning the proper role of mental
anguish under DTPA.
VI. THE ROLE OF MENTAL ANGUISH UNDER THE DTPA
Since its inception in 1973, the DTPA has been interpreted and
analyzed in more than 150 opinions.' 17 Despite the diversity of ju-
risprudential philosophies that have graced the court during the
past two decades, the construction of the Act has remained consis-
tent. "' This uniformity has resulted, in large part, from the courts'
willingness to adhere to certain guiding principles when applying
'" Milt Ferguson Motor Co. v. Zeretzke, 827 S.W.2d at 357.
"2 Id. at 357.
"See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993) (affirming the knowledge require-
ment of Luna v. North Star Dodge).
"Id. at 595-96.
"l'Id.
""For a brief discussion of the facts of Boyles v. Kerr, see introduction.
"'855 S.W.2d 513 (tex. 1993). Boyles v. Kerr, NO. D-0963, WL 353277, at 4 (Tex.
Dec. 2, 1992).
""Mark L. Kincaid, Rules of Judicial Construction-Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA
Cases, 23 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 687, 689 (1992). In 1992, Mark L. Kincaid wrote an article
titled, Rules of Judicial Construction - Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA Cases. These
principles articulated by Mr. Kincaid are helpful in deciding the proper role of mental
anguish under the DTPA.
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the Act. 119 By analyzing some of these principles and applying them
to the law of mental anguish as interpreted by the Act, one can bet-
ter understand the proper role of mental anguish in the DTPA
case. 120
A. Liberal Construction
In 1977, in a case styled Woods v. Littleton, 12' the Supreme Court
of Texas made it clear that the DTPA was to be liberally construed
so as to give effect to the legislature's intent that the Act be a power-
ful remedy for the consumer.' 22 In fact, the language of the Act
perpetuates this same theme, stating that "[t]his subchapter shall be
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes,
which are to protect consumers against false, misleading, and de-
ceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of
warranty and to provide efficient and economical procedures to se-
cure such protection."'' 2 3 In Woods, the Court further defined this
section of the DTPA, holding that courts "shall look diligently for
the intention of the Legislature, keeping in view at all times the old
law, the evil and the remedy."'
24
Although this mandate for liberal construction is not unique to
the DTPA, the courts' consistent application of this principle em-
phasizes its importance when interpreting the Act.' 25 However, lib-
'"Id. (discussing the consistency'of the construction given to the.DTPA by Texas
courts).
"See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Tex. 1977) (setting out the princi-
ples applicable to construing the DTPA); accord Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d
682, 686 (Tex. 1980); City of Mason v. West Tex. Util. Co., 150 Tex. 18, 237 S.W.2d
273, 278 (1951) (holding that construing the DTPA is determined by legislative intent);
Mark L. Kincaid, Rules ofJudicial Construction-Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA Cases, 23
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 687, 688,(1992).
... Mark L. Kincaid, Rules of Judicial Construction-Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA
Cases, 23 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 687, 688 (1992).
'22Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977).
''"Id. at 665; e.g. Pennington, 606 S.W. 2d at 686 (construing the DTPA requires pri-
mary emphasis on the intention of the Legislature); City of Mason, 150 Tex. 18, 237
S.W.2d at 278 (construing an act of the Legislature is not confined to the literal meaning
of the words) citing Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code § 17.44 (Vernon 1993); Mark L. Kincaid,
Rules ofJudicial Construction- Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA Cases, 23 TEx. TECH. L.
REV. 687, 689 (1992) (stating that Texas courts have consistently given the DTPA a
liberal construction).
,Woods, 554 S.W.2d at 665.
'12 1Id. which further states:
[Tihe fundamental rule controlling the construction of a statute is to ascertain
the intention of the Legislature 'expressed therein. That intention should be
ascertained from the entire act, and not from isolated portions thereof. This
court has repeatedly held that the intention of the Legislature in enacting a law
is the law itself; and hence the aim and object of construction is to ascertain and
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eral construction should be pursued in light of the statutory goals of
encouraging injured consumers to seek compensation and deterring
sellers from taking advantage of naive consumers.' 26 By awarding
treble damages to the injured consumer, the Legislature empha-
sized the importance of these twin goals.' 27 Furthermore, the public
policy of this state, as embodied in the DTPA, encourages consumer
litigation. The Supreme Court of Texas recognized this in Pen-
nington v. Singleton where it held 'that the DTPA is intended "to en-
courage privately initiated consumer litigation, reducing the need
for public enforcement."'128 In fact, the incentives in the Act, i.e.,
treble damages and attorney fees, encourage the consumer to pur-
sue small claims.' 29 Surprisingly, however, this liberal construction
has not been extended to mental anguish damages under the
DTPA.13
0
Requiring proof of a "knowing" violation to recover mental
anguish damages under the DTPA made it more difficult for the
enforce the legislative intent, and not to defeat, nullify, or thwart it .... It is
settled that the intention of the Legislature controls the language used in an
act, and in construing such an act the court is not necessarily' confined to the
literal meaning of the words used therein, and the intent rather than the strict
letter of the act will control.
citing City of Mason v. West Tex. Util. Co.,,237 S.W.2d 273, 278 (1951); see TEX. Bus. &
COMM. CODE ANN. Sec. 17.44 (Vernon 1993); accord Mark L. Kincaid, Rules of Judicial
Construction- Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA Cases, 23 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 687, 689
(1992) (discussing liberal construction of the DTPA).
1
21See Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 355 (Tex. 1987); Weitzel v.
Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985); McKiley v. Drozd, 685 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex.
1985); Mark L. Kincaid, Rules of Judicial Construction-Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA
Cases, 23 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 687, 690 (1992) (discussing the consistency of DTPA
interpretation).
'"See Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Tex. 1985) (interpreting DTPA liber-
ally promotes its purpose of protecting consumers); Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 691 (stat-
ing that the DTPA provides a remedy for one time offenses which can not be handled
effectively by state law); Woods, 554 S.W.2d at 669 (stating that DTPA allows consumers
to bring suit where it might not otherwise be economically efficient); John Hill, Intro-
duction, Consumer Protection Symposium, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 609, 611 (1977) (providing rem-
edy under DTPA makes sellers more accountable to the consumer).
""See Pope v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 703 F.2d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding
that treble damages provide consumers with a remedy for deceptive trade practices with-
out the burdens of common law); Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 686 (DTPA provides treble
damages to discourage deceptive trade practices); WIoods, 554 S.W.2d at 671 (trebling
damages is mandatory); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN § 17.50(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992);
Philip K. Maxwell, Public and Private Rights and Remedies Under The Deceptive Trade Practices -
Consumer Protection Act, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 617 (1977).
"'Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 690.
"Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 690-91 (Tex. 1980); Mark L. Kincaid, Rules of Judicial Con-
struction-Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA Cases, 23 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 687, 692 (1992)
(discussing the prohibitive costs associated with deceptive trade practice suits); John
Hill, Introduction, Consumer Protection Symposium, 8 Sr. MARY'S L.J. 609 (1977).
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DTPA plaintiff to recover under the Act.' 3 ' Furthermore, by adopt-
ing a more culpable mental state than required by the common law,
the Supreme Court has violated the twin goals of the DTPA by dis-
couraging consumer litigation and thwarting the deterrence effect of
the statute.
B. Statutory Obstacles
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Texas further defined the scope of
the DTPA, holding that "[t]he DTPA does not represent a codifica-
tion of the common law."' 3 2 By refusing to apply the parole evi-
dence rule,'13 by rejecting an intent requirement, 3 4 by rejecting the
common law definition of reliance, 3 5 and by rejecting the defenses
of estoppel and waiver,' 3 6 the court removed the common law ob-
stacles that consumers once faced.
Prior to Boyles v. Kerr, the Texas Supreme Court in Garrard recog-
nized the tort of negligent infliction of mental distress, removing
obstacles to the recovery of mental anguish damages. By allowing a
plaintiff to recover when the mental anguish resulted merely from
the negligence of the defendant, the court recognized the impor-
tance of emotional injuries. Conversely, by implementing a know-
,2,Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993)(Doggett, J., dissenting); e.g. Luna, 667
S.W.2dI 15 (Tex. 1984) (recovery absent'proof of knowing violation is barred); Duncan,
603 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1980)(stating that recovery under DTPA requires proof of a
knowing violation).
'"See Luna, 667 S.W.2d 115 (stating that a knowledge requirement is necessary for
recovery under DTPA) ; e.g. Duncan, 603 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1980)(holding that recovery
under the DTPA requires proof of knowing violation); Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently
Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1526 (1985) (relying only on
foreseeability provides virtually no limit on liability for mental anguish).
"'Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980) (common law defenses are not
controlling); e.g. Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. 1988); Shanandoah Assoc.
v. J.K. Properties, 741 S.W.2d 470, 496 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied); Mark L.
Kincaid, Rules of Judicial Construction-Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA Cases, 23 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 687, 699-70 (1992) (discussing the DTPA and its relationship to the com-
mon law);John L. Hill, Introduction, Consumer Protection Symposium, 8 ST. MARY'S LJ. 609
(1977) (discussing the changes the DTPA made to the common law).
4Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. 1988); Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d
598, 599-600 (Tex. 1985); Mark L. Kincaid, Rules ofJudicial Construction-Making and Argu-
ing the Law in DTPA Cases, 23 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 687, 699 (1992); See also Karen Guerra,
DTPA Precludes Use of Merger & Parole Evidence Rule in Breach of Warranty Suits: Alvarodo v.
Bolton, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 373 (1989).
"'Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d at 581; Alvarado, 749 S.W.2d at 48; 11eitzel, 691
S.W.2d at 600 (Tex. 1985); Mark L. Kincaid, Rules ofJudicial Construction-Making and Argu-
ing the Law in DTPA Cases, 23 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 687, 700 (1992).
"Celtex Corp. v. Gracy Meadow Owners Assoc., Inc., 847 S.W. 2d 384, 391 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1993, writ denied); Weitzel, 691 S.W.2d at 600; Mark L. Kincaid, Rules of
Judicial Construction- Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA Cases, 23 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 687,
699 (1992).
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ing requirement, and making it more difficult to recover mental
anguish damages under the DTPA than under the common law, the
standard in Luna created an obstacle for consumers seeking mental
anguish damages under the Act. Although the DTPA is not a codifi-
cation of the common law,' 3 7 "[blecause the DTPA was intended to
help consumers overcome common-law obstacles to recovery, it
necessarily follows that implying into the DTPA any ... obstacle to
recovery that has been dispensed with at common law, or giving less
relief under the DTPA than would be available at common law, is
improper."138 The Act should, however, "incorporate common-law
theories that are consistent with the mandate of liberal construction
and the underlying policy of protecting consumers."13 9
In 1984, when Luna was decided, a plaintiff could recover for
mental anguish only when the defendant's conduct was either
grossly negligent or more culpable and, therefore, establishing a
"knowing" finding for recovery was somewhat consistent with the
underlying policies of the Act and the liberal construction prerequi-
site. However, as mental anguish jurisprudence evolved, and the
common law recognized the importance of one's interest in their
emotional well being, the common law eventually loosened the stan-
dard for recovering mental anguish damages. 40 In 1987, the court
allowed recovery when the mental anguish resulted only from the
negligence of the defendant. 14' In December of 1992, the Supreme
Court of Texas stopped the evolution of the law of mental anguish
in Texas, and retreated back to the Draconian common law princi-
"'Chrysler Corp., v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1197 (5th Cir.
1992); Eagle Properties, Ltd., v. Scharbauer, 807 S.W.2d 714, 724 (Tex. 1990); Ken-
nemore v. Bennet, 755 S.W.2d 89, 91 (Tex. 1988); Mark L. Kincaid, Rules of Judicial
Construction-Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA Cases, 23 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 687, 699
(1992).
"Alvarodo, 749 S.W.2d at 48 (citing Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d at 616); Shanandoah
Assoc. v. J.K. Properties, 741 S.W.2d 470, 496 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied);
Mark L. Kincaid, Rules ofJudicial Construction-Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA Cases, 23
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 687, 699-70 (1992) (discussing the DTPA and its relationship to the
common law);John L. Hill, Introduction, Consumer Protection Symposium, 8 ST. MARY's L.J.
609 (1977) (discussing the changes the DTPA made to the common law).
""Mark L. Kincaid, Rules of Judicial Construction-Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA
Cases, 23 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 687, 688 (1992).
'Id. at 700.
4'See St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d at 654 (abolishing physical manifes-
tation requirement); see also Natividad v. Alexis, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Tex.App.-
El Paso 1992, no writ) (holding that mental anguish is a fact question for the court);
Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983) (mental anguish damages authorized
without proof of physical injury); Charles E. Cantu, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
Expanding the Rule Evolved Since Dillon, 17 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1557, 1574-76 (1987) (not-
ing that courts have acknowledged mental distress without an accompanying physical
impairment).
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pies articulated prior to 1987. 142
C. Creating Common Law Obstacles
Liberal construction requires that the court not imply any obsta-
cles to recovery.' 43 The purpose of the DTPA is to overcome, not
create, "common-law obstacles to recovery that ha[ve] made effec-
tive consumer relief difficult to obtain."' , 44 This view is evidenced
by the court's rejection of implied defenses, 45 its refusal to confine
the DTPA to merchants, 46 and its broad application of the term
"consumer." 47 In fact, courts have consistently rejected defendants
who try to bypass the provisions of the DTPA by developing loop-
holes.' 48 "The Texas Supreme Court has never wavered, and in
case after case it has refused to imply any additional" obstacles into
the DTPA. 149 By requiring a knowing finding, the court has created
a common law obstacle to recovery, making it more difficult for the
DTPA plaintiff to recover mental anguish damages.
D. Legislative Intent
In numerous decisions interpreting the DTPA, courts have looked
"'4 St. Elizabeth Hosp., 730 S.W.2d at 649.
'4'Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
'4 4TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN § 17.50 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1992); see Kennedy v.
Sale, 689 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Tex. 1985) (giving the Act its most comprehensive applica-
tion possible); Cameron, 618 S.W.2d at 539- 40 (restricting the application of the DTPA is
against legislative intent); Mark L. Kincaid, Rules ofJudicial Construction-Making and Argu-
ing the Law in DTPA Cases, 23 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 687, 693 n.45 (1992).
'Mark L. Kincaid, Rules of Judicial Construction-Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA
Cases, 23 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 687, 693 n.45 (1992).
'"4 See Pope v. Rollins Protective Serv. Co., 703 F.2d at 201 (removing the burdens of
the numerous common law defenses is the reason DTPA was enacted); see also Alvarodo,
749 S.W.2d at 48; Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d at 616; Joanne M. D'Alcomo, Resolving the
Conflict Between Arbitration Clauses and the Claims Under the Deceptive Trade Practice Acts, 64
B.U. L. Rev. 377, 388 (1984) (discussing providing consumers with a cause of action
without proving numerous defenses).
" Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d at 691; e.g. Big H. Auto Auction v. Saenz Motors,
665 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. 1984) (holding that the DTPA includes all who sell goods);
Rotello v. Ring Around Products, Inc., 614 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex.App.-Houston [ 14th
Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (defining merchant as someone other than a consumer who
is party to a transaction).
' 'See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1992); also Ken-
nedy v. Sale, S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. 1985) (construing the term liberally); Cameron v.
Terrel & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d at 541 (construing § 17.50 liberally is necessary to pro-
tect consumers).
'""See Mark L. Kincaid, Rules ofJudicial Construction-Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA
Cases, 23 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 687, 693 n.45 (1992); see also Autohaus v. Aguilar, 794
S.W.2d 459, 466 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied) (seeking loopholes would cir-
cumvent legislative intent); Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 687 (interpreting good and service
broadly to prevent loopholes).
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for guidance in the debates and amendments surrounding the legis-
lation. °50 To discern the legislature's intent, the courts frequently
consider language that the legislature removed or chose not to in-
clude.' 5 1 In 1979, the Texas State Legislature amended section
17.50 of the DTPA to allow a consumer to recover "[t]he amount of
actual damages found by the trier of fact."' 52 The debate on the
amendment evidences the legislature's intent with respect to mental
anguish damages. The dialogue between Representatives Gibson
and Hill is indicative of the legislature's intent:
GIBSON (OF ECTOR): would it include any damages that
were incurred by the plaintiffs such as mental anguish?
HILL (OF Po'rrER): It would include any damages that you
could convince the jury had occurred as a result of a viola-
tion of the DTPA.
GIBSON: So, in other words, any damages involving mental
anguish, any damages that were consequential from the act
of the defendant would be included in your amendment, is
that correct?
HILL: That's correct.' 53
The legislative debates over the 1979 amendment indicate that ac-
tual damages included damages involving mental distress. 54 The
legislature failed to distinguish mental anguish damages from other
types of actual damages. In fact, no mention was made of increasing
the culpability for mental anguish under the Act. Instead, the de-
bates indicate that mental anguish should be awarded if the jury is
"'Mark L. Kincaid, Rules of Judicial Construction-Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA
Cases, 23 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 687, 693 n.45 (1992).
... E.g. Robinson v. Preston Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 500, 502 (Tex. 1982)
(discussing legislative history); Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 615-16 (Tex. 1980)
(looking to the legislative intent); Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 667 (Tex. 1977)
(considering legislative intent in light of the 1975 amendments); Mark L. Kincaid, Rules
of Judicial Construction- Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA Cases, 23 TEX. TECH L. REV.
687, 693 (1992) (discussing the Texas Supreme Court's refusal to allow defenses, excep-
tions or exclusions to be implied into the DTPA).
"'5 See Melody Homes Mfg. Co., v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 354 (Tex. 1987) (looking
to legislative history to assist in clarifying ambiguity); Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579,
583 (holding that deleting a term from a definition bars the court from implying that
term as an element); Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980) (deleting a
provision from a pending bill discloses the legislative intent to defeat that provision);
Mark L. Kincaid, Rules ofludicial Construction-Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA Cases, 23
TEX. TECH L. REV. 687, 694 n.7 (1992) (looking to the legislative history of DTPA);John
L. Hill, Introduction, Consumer Protection Symposium, 8 ST. MARY'S L. J. 609, 613 (1977)
(noting the intent of the legislature to leave the scope of the DTPA broad by abolishing
exceptions).
' TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 1979).
" 4Timothy G. Chovanec, ET AL., MENTAL ANGUISH DAMAGES, S-7 (1992) (the actual
language can be found in the legislative library located in Austin).
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convinced that the harm occurred, regardless of whether or not
there is a knowing finding.
By treating mental anguish damages differently from other dam-
ages, the Luna and Kerr courts violate the legislative intent which
requires damages to be awarded if you can "convince the jury [that
the damages] had occurred as a result of a violation of the
DTPA."' 55 Traditionally, we have relied on the ability of "twelve
Texas citizens, empaneled as a jury, to distinguish between the
fraudulent and the genuine."'' 56 By distinguishing mental anguish
damages from other actual damages under the DTPA, the Luna and
Kerr courts not only invade the province of the jury, but also violate
the legislative intent of the Act. Furthermore, by requiring a know-
ing finding, the court chose to do what the legislature rejected. 157
VII. BOYLES v. KERR-THE WRONG DECISION AT THE RIGHT TIME
Prior to December 2 1,992, mental anguish jurisprudence was
evolving at rapid pace, recognizing the individual's right to peace of
mind. With the stroke of a pen, however, the Supreme Court of
Texas reversed almost a decade of mental anguish jurisprudence.
Six years prior to Boyles v. Kerr, the Garrard court recognized that
mental injures can be "just as severe and debilitating" as physical
injuries;158 thus honoring the principle that "[f]reedom from severe
emotional distress is an interest which the bar should serve to pro-
tect."' 59 By adopting the tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress, the Texas courts took a leadership role, providing an exam-
ple for other jurisdictions. 60 However, the majority in Kerr re-
treated from this position, holding that the decision in Garrard was
1561d.
'"Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 613 (Tex. 1992) (Doggett,J., dissenting).
" "E.g. Melody Homes Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 354 (Tex. 1987) (looking
to legislative history to assist in clarifying ambiguity); Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d
579, 583 (Tex. 1985) (deleting a term from a definition bars the court from implying
that term as an element); Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980) (deleting a
provision from a pending bill discloses the legislative intent to defeat that provision);
Mark L. Kincaid, Rules ofJudicial Construction-Making and Arguing the Law in DTPA Cases, 23
Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 687, 694 n.7 (1992) (looking to the legislative history of DTPA);John
L. Hill, Introduction, Consumer Protection Symposium, 8 St. Mary's L. J. 609, 613 (1977)
(noting the intent of the legislature to leave the scope of the DTPA broad by abolishing
exceptions).
'"St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex. 1987); e.g. Charles E.
Cantu, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Expanding the Rule Evolved Since Dillon, 17
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1557, 1574-76 (1987).
."'St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d at 653.
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"out of step" with other jurisdictions 161
To justify their decision, the majority adopted the logic articu-
lated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 436A which held that
an " 'emotional disturbance which is not so severe and serious as to
have physical consequences is normally in the realm of the trivial,
and so falls within the maxim that the law does not concern itself
with trifles ... so temporary, so evanescent, and so relatively harm-
less and unimportant, that the task of compensating for it would un-
duly burden the courts and the defendants. . . [elmotional
disturbance may be too easily feigned, depending, as it must, very
largely upon the subjective testimony of the plaintiff... recovery for
it might open too wide a door for false claimants who have suffered
no real harm at all."'16
2
Three decades ago, this same logic was used to enforce a physical
manifestation requirement. And although the court did not reim-
plement such a requirement, the courts recognition of the anti-
quated logic through its holding in Kerr is based on Draconian ideas
of mental anguish jurisprudence.' 63
Despite the fact that litigants can feign injuries, the Texas
Supreme Court has empowered the jury with the responsibility of
distinguishing between the malingerer and those who have suffered
compensable injuries.164 The majority, however, through its deci-
sion in Kerr evidences the Texas Supreme Court's "increasing dis-
dain for mere ordinary Texans making such determination as
jurors."'' 65 Moreover, by denying a remedy because of the warrant-
less conduct of some "arbitrarily den[ies] court access to persons
with valid claims and do[es] not serve the best interests of the pub-
lic." 66 Although mental anguish may be difficult to put a price tag
on, it is no more difficult to evaluate in financial terms than pain and
suffering, "and no less a real injury, than physical pain.... [T]he
law is not for the protection of the physically sound alone."' 67
The Kerr court's fear of unwarranted mental anguish claims has
"'Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 612 (Tex 1992) (Doggett, J., dissenting).
t .'Id.
"'Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A, Cmt. b (1965) (as cited in Boyles v. Kerr, 855
S.W.2d at 613 (Doggett, J., dissenting)).
"'Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d at 613 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
""Id. (referring to St. Elizabeth Hospital, 730 S.W.2d at 654).
""Id. at 613 (Doggett, J., dissenting); e.g. LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannet Indep. Sch.
Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 54 (Tex. 1992)(Doggett, J., dissenting); Reagan v. Vaughan, 804
S.W.2d 463, 491 (Tex. 1991)(Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting).
'7 Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d at 613 (Doggett, J., dissenting) (quoting St. Elizabeth Hosp.,
730 S.W.2d at 654).
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been rejected by commentators and courts. 68 Despite the prece-
dent supporting mental anguish claims, there has not been an ex-
plosion of mental anguish litigation, 69 nor has there been any
evidence to indicate that the Garrard decision "has strained Texas
courts by requiring litigation of trivial claims."170 In order to main-
tain the balance between limiting parties exposure to trivial claims
and the commitment to ensure compensation for serious injuries,
the court should disregard the "knowing" finding articulated in
Luna. 171
The court in Garrard held that the lack of physical symptoms does
not impact the authenticity of the mental injury. 172 Likewise, the fact
that the DTPA defendant's actions were committed "knowingly"
does not affect the authenticity of the emotional injuries sus-
tained.' 73 The converse proposition rewards the less culpable and
punishes the more blameworthy, when the emotional injury sus-
tained may be more severe in the former case. 174 If two DTPA
defentants participate in conduct that results in a severe emotional
injury, and only one commits the act knowingly, why should one
plaintiff receive compensation and not the other?
VII. CONCLUSION
The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized an individ-
ual's right to be free from mental anguish. "[A]n emotional loss can
be 'just as severe and debilitating' as a physical one,"' 75 and the law
should protect one's interest in freedom from emotional distress.
The Supreme Court of Texas has rejected these principles and cre-
ated obstacles for the DTPA plaintiff that not only violate the draft-
ers' intent that the Act be liberally construed to compensate the
victimized consumer, but that are also contrary to the Act's goals.
'Id. at 613.
""Id. at 613 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
""Id. at 613 (Doggett, J., dissenting); e.g. James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109, 117 (Neb.
1985) (stating that there is no litigation explosion); Schultz v. Barbeton Glass Co., 447
N.E.2d 109, 112-120 (Ohio 1983) (no increase in litigation); Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls:
Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 33, 362-65 (1984) (no in-
crease in litigation); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 54, at 360 (5th ed., 1984) (no corresponding increase in litigation).
'7 Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d at 614. (Doggett, J., dissenting).
'72 d. at 613.
'"Id. at 616.
t74 Id.
'171Id. at 613 (discussing the fact that implementing a physical manifestation require-
ment "rewards the weak and punishes the strong and states that the emotional injury
sustained may be on par with the physical injury").
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By narrowly interpreting the DPTA, the court begins to emasculate
legislation that has revolutionalized consumer law in Texas.
In Boyles v. Kerr, the legal landscape afforded the Supreme Court
of Texas an opportunity to reconcile mental anguish damages under
the DTPA with mental anguish jurisprudence. Instead of aggres-
sively recognizing one's interest in their emotional well being, the
court retreated, reversing almost a decade of mental anguish juris-
prudence. By reaffirming the court's decision in Luna, and holding
the tort of negligent infliction of mental distress as being "out of
step" with other jurisdictions, the court has retreated from its role
as a leader in mental anguish jurisprudence. "In the march to jus-
tice, Texas should not fear leadership."'176 If every such decision is
to be "erased from the books as being 'out of step,' Texas is
doomed to last place in legal thinking. '"177
'I"Id. at 611 quoting St. Elizabeth Hosp., 730 S.W.2d at 653.
'1 71d at 612.
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